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The Decline of U.S.
Manufacturing Employment—
Automation and Trade
Susan N. Houseman
ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS
 U.S. manufacturing
experienced unprecedented
employment declines
in the 2000s.
 Strong output and
productivity growth in
manufacturing are often
cited as evidence that U.S.
manufacturing is doing
well and that automation
is primarily responsible for
the employment declines.
A careful look at the
evidence does not support
this popular view.

This article is based on “Understanding the
Decline in Manufacturing Employment”
(Houseman 2018).
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The manufacturing sector experienced a
precipitous and historically unprecedented decline
in employment in the 2000s, which coincided
with a surge in imports, weak growth in exports,
and a yawning trade deficit. The sharp job losses
in manufacturing significantly contributed to the
weak employment growth and low labor force
participation characterizing the U.S. economy for
much of this period.
The plight of U.S. manufacturing featured
prominently in the 2016 presidential election, with
candidates Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders
arguing that globalization had severely damaged
U.S. factories and workers. That message resonated
in many American communities and helped
propel Trump to the presidency. Making good on
campaign promises, the president pulled out of the
Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement, has proposed
renegotiating the North American Free Trade
Agreement, and most recently has threatened high
tariffs on Chinese imports, raising concerns about
a trade war.
An alternative view, which many economists
embrace, holds that automation, not globalization,
largely explains manufacturing’s relative
employment declines and, in recent years, steep job
losses. As evidence, proponents of this view point
to statistics showing robust output growth and
much higher productivity growth in manufacturing
relative to the aggregate economy. This perspective
often is presented as the consensus view among
economists and taken as fact in media reports.
The view, however, reflects a misreading of
the data. Although automation is occurring in
manufacturing, as in other sectors of the economy,
neither the descriptive nor the research evidence
supports the view that automation was the leading
cause of the relative and absolute decline in
manufacturing employment in the 2000s.

The Collapse of Manufacturing Employment in
the 2000s
Manufacturing employment trended upward in
the years following World War II, peaking at over
19 million in 1979. From 1979 to 1989, the year
of the next business cycle peak, manufacturing
shed 1.4 million jobs, or 7.4 percent of its base,

Rapid productivity growth in
the computer industry—and, by
extension, the strong productivity
growth in manufacturing—largely
reflects improvements in high-tech
products, not automation.
with job losses concentrated in the primary metals
and textile and apparel industries. Employment in
manufacturing was relatively stable in the 1990s.
Manufacturing employment plunged in the
2000s. Between the business cycle peaks of 2000
and 2007, the sector’s employment dropped by 3.4
million, or 20 percent. Although employment in
manufacturing, a cyclically sensitive sector, often
drops sharply during recessions, the early 2000s
marked the first time that employment in the
sector did not entirely or largely recover during the
expansion. Manufacturing employment was hardhit again during the Great Recession of 2008–2009,
rebounding only slightly during the ensuing
recovery. In total, since 2000, manufacturing
employment has fallen by nearly 5 million, or over
28 percent. Unlike the declines experienced in
the 1980s, the job losses have been broad-based,
affecting all industries.
Widespread plant closures accompanied
the employment declines. From 2000 to 2014,

EMPLOYMENT RESEARCH • APRIL 2018

W.E. UPJOHN INSTITUTE

The Decline of U.S. Manufacturing Employment—Automation and Trade

the number of manufacturing
establishments dropped by more than
78,000, a 22 percent decline.
The Puzzle
Reflecting stable or declining
employment in the manufacturing
sector, the share of private sector
employment in manufacturing has
dropped steadily, and relative declines
have been particularly prominent since
the 1980s. Manufacturing employment
as a share of private sector employment
peaked at 35 percent in 1953; by 2016,
that share had fallen to just under
10 percent. Manufacturing’s share of
private sector GDP has experienced
a parallel decline: manufacturing’s
contribution to private sector GDP
peaked at 33 percent in 1953, and by
2016 its share was just 13 percent.1 The
trends in these shares, depicted in the
right scale of Figure 1, suggest that
performance in the manufacturing
sector has been weak relative to the rest
of the economy.
Figure 1 also shows indices for
the private sector and manufacturing
real (inflation-adjusted) GDP on the

left scale. Paradoxically, in view of
manufacturing’s declining employment
and GDP shares, real GDP growth in
manufacturing has largely kept pace
with that of the private sector overall.
Only since the Great Recession has real
output growth been noticeably slower
in manufacturing than in the aggregate
economy.
Reconciling Manufacturing’s
Declining Shares with Robust
Output Growth
How can these apparently
contradictory trends be reconciled? If
real GDP growth for manufacturing
has kept pace with real GDP growth
in the aggregate economy yet
manufacturing’s share of private sector
GDP is falling, it must be the case that
prices of manufactured goods have
grown more slowly than the average
growth in prices of goods and services
in the economy.
Similarly, manufacturing’s declining
share of private sector employment
results because manufacturing
employment is growing more slowly
than the average for the private sector.

Figure 1: Manufacturing and Private Industry Real GDP; Manufacturing GDP and Employment Shares
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The relationships between labor,
GDP, and productivity growth may
be expressed as a simple accounting
identity, which shows that the
difference in the growth rates of labor
employed in the aggregate private
sector and in manufacturing is equal to
the difference in their real GDP growth
rates less the difference in their labor
productivity growth rates.2
If manufacturing’s real GDP
growth rate is approximately the
same as the average for the private
sector, as indicated in Figure
1, then all, or virtually all, of
manufacturing’s declining employment
share is accounted for by higher
labor productivity growth. Many
economists have taken the patterns
shown in Figure 1, and related
descriptive evidence, to infer that
the higher productivity growth in
manufacturing—implicitly or explicitly
assumed to reflect automation—
has largely caused the relative and
absolute declines of manufacturing
employment. Even when some role for
trade is recognized, it is deemed small,
and the decline is taken as inevitable.3
Broadly, there are two problems
with this conclusion. First, the
descriptive evidence is misleading
and has been widely misinterpreted.
The low growth in prices, strong real
output growth, and high productivity
growth in manufacturing are largely
driven by one industry—computer
and electronic products (hereafter
computer industry)—and reflect the
statistical adjustment of price deflators
of computers and semiconductors for
improvements in product quality.
Second, as researchers widely
recognize, accounting identities and
other descriptive evidence per se
cannot be used to draw inferences
about the causes of the relative and
absolute decline in manufacturing
employment. Productivity growth
does not by itself cause employment
reductions and may reflect many
forces, including import competition
and offshoring.
I discuss each problem in turn.
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Figure 2: Real GDP, Private Industry and Manufacturing, with and without Computer Industry
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The Outsized Effect of the Computer
Industry on Manufacturing Statistics
Many of the products produced in
the computer industry have undergone
substantial and rapid technical
advances. The semiconductors
embedded in our electronics, for
example, are much more powerful
today than they were a decade or even
a year ago. Likewise, the computers
and related devices that consumers
and businesses buy today have much
greater functionality than in the past.
The statistical agencies account for the
rapid improvements in product quality
in the industry through adjustments
to price deflators; for some products,
adjusted prices have declined rapidly
over time.
Adjusting product price deflators
in the computer industry for
improvements in product quality, in
turn, has large effects on the industry’s
measured real GDP and productivity
growth. Although the computer
industry has always accounted for
less than 15 percent of value-added
in manufacturing, because of its
extraordinary measured real GDP and
productivity growth, it has an outsized
effect on measured real output and
productivity growth in the sector,
skewing these statistics and giving a
misleading impression of the health of
American manufacturing.
Figure 2 displays indices of
real GDP in the private sector and
manufacturing, as published and
omitting the computer industry. The
computer industry has had large
effects on measured real GDP growth
in manufacturing since the 1980s.
From 1979 to 2000, measured real
GDP growth in manufacturing was
97 percent of the average for the
private sector; when the computer
industry is dropped from both
series, manufacturing’s real GDP
growth rate is just 45 percent that of
the private sector average. Between
2000 and 2016, real GDP growth in
manufacturing was 63 percent of
the average private sector growth.
Omitting the computer industry from
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each series, manufacturing’s measured
real output growth is only about 0.2
percent per year and just 12 percent of
the average for the private sector in the
2000s. Without the computer industry,
measured real output in manufacturing
was lower in 2016 than in 2007 at
the start of the Great Recession.
In addition, without the computer
industry, labor productivity growth was
no higher or only somewhat higher
in manufacturing than in the private
sector overall (Houseman 2018).
Once the anomalous effects of
the computer industry are excluded,
descriptive data no longer provide
prima facie evidence that higher
rates of automation were primarily
responsible for the long-term decline in
manufacturing’s share of employment.
Rather, they suggest that understanding
the reasons for the slow output growth
in manufacturing output is critical.
It is also important to recognize
that the rapid productivity growth
accompanying output growth in
the computer industry has little to
do with automation—production
of computers and semiconductors
has been automated for many years.

Rather, rapid productivity growth
in the industry—and, by extension,
the strong productivity growth in
manufacturing—largely reflects
improvements in high-tech products.
Nor is the rapid growth in measured
computer and semiconductor output
a good indicator of the international
competitiveness of domestic
manufacturing of these products.
As detailed in Houseman, Bartik,
and Sturgeon (2015), the locus of
production of these products has been
shifting to Asia, even as the industry
was driving the apparent robust growth
in the manufacturing sector.
Interpreting productivity growth
Labor productivity is measured
as real GDP (the returns to capital
and labor) divided by labor input
(hours worked or employment).
Labor productivity will increase if
processes are automated—that is, if
businesses invest in capital equipment
and that equipment substitutes for
workers in the production process.
Measured growth in labor productivity,
however, captures many factors
besides automation. As just discussed,

3
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the strong productivity growth in
the manufacturing sector has been
driven by productivity growth in the
computer industry, which largely stems
from product improvements owing to
research and development.
In addition, manufacturers have
outsourced many activities previously
done in-house, either to domestic or
foreign suppliers, or have shifted their
input sources to lower-cost, often
foreign, providers. If the outsourced
activities are primarily done by
relatively low-paid workers, or if the
outsourced labor is cheaper than
the in-house labor, measured labor
productivity will increase. Shifting
to lower-cost input sources will
raise measured productivity as well
(Houseman et al. 2011).
International competition also
may directly impact measured
manufacturing productivity by
affecting the composition of products
produced and processes used in
the United States. The industries
and plants within industries most
affected by increased competition
from low-wage countries will likely
be the most labor-intensive, raising
measured labor productivity. For
example, case study research on the
impact of the wave of Asian furniture
imports in the early 2000s shows
that plant closures and employment
declines were concentrated in the most
labor-intensive furniture industries,
and within industries less affected
by imports, the most labor-intensive
processes were offshored.4
Productivity growth surged in
some manufacturing industries during
the early 2000s, a period marked by a
precipitous decline in manufacturing
employment and factory closures. A
superficial reading of the data might
lead one to conclude that productivity
in the form of automation caused
the relative and absolute declines
in manufacturing employment. Yet
given the massive structural change
occurring at the time, accelerated
productivity growth may largely reflect
changes in the composition of products

4

produced and processes done in the
United States, and may have largely
been a consequence of international
trade.
Discussion
The aggregate manufacturing
output and productivity statistics,
dominated by the computer industry,
mask considerable weakness in most
manufacturing industries, where real
output growth has been much slower
than in the private sector overall
since the 1980s and has been anemic
or declining since 2000. Because
manufacturing has deep supply chains
and accounts for a disproportionate
share of R&D in the economy, the
health of manufacturing industries has
important implications for employment
and output growth and innovation
in the economy. Understanding the
causes of the decline is necessary for
developing sensible policy responses.
The prevailing view that automation
largely caused the swift relative and
absolute declines in U.S. manufacturing
employment in the 2000s reflects a
misinterpretation of the numbers.
Moreover, the automation view is not
backed by rigorous research. Studies
have failed to find that automation was
a significant cause of the precipitous
decline in manufacturing employment
in the 2000s. And while industrial
robots may have the potential
to displace many workers in the
future, any effects on manufacturing
employment to date are small.
A large and growing body of
research has also examined the effects
of trade on domestic manufacturing
in the 2000s. No study captures all
aspects of globalization and its effects
on manufacturing and aggregate
employment, and the limitations of any
individual study need to be recognized.
Collectively, however, the research
points to sizable adverse effects from
trade on employment, output, and
investment.5 The denial by many in
both the Republican and Democrat
parties of globalization’s significant role
in manufacturing’s recent employment

declines has inhibited much-needed,
informed debate over trade policies.
NOTES
1. GDP, also called value added, reflects the
contributions an industry or sector makes to
output from its labor and capital.
ሶ ் െ ܲܦܩሶ ெሶ ሻ
2. Formally, ் ܮሶ െ ܮெሶ ൌ ሺܲܦܩ
െ ሺܲ݀ݎሶ ் െ ܲ݀ݎሶ ሶ ெ ሻ, where the T and M
subscripts indicate the total private and
ሶ , and ܲ݀ݎ
ሶ ሶ
manufacturing sectors, and ் ܮ,ሶ ܲܦܩ
represent the growth rates in labor, GDP,
and labor productivity, respectively.

3. See, for example, DeLong, Brad. 2017.
“NAFTA and Other Trade Deals Have Not
Gutted American Manufacturing—Period.”
Vox Media. I provide additional citations in
Houseman (2018).
4. See Holmes, Thomas J. 2011. “The Case
of the Disappearing Large-Employer
Manufacturing Plants: Not Much of a
Mystery After All.” Economic Policy Paper
11-4. Minneapolis, MN: Federal Reserve
Bank of Minneapolis.
5. I provide an overview and citations
to studies on automation and trade in
Houseman (2018).
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Pre-K Effectiveness
at a Large Scale
Timothy J. Bartik and Brad Hershbein
In the past 15 years, four-yearolds’ enrollment in state-funded
prekindergarten in the United States
has more than doubled, with roughly
one-third now enrolled. Advocates
have pushed for further expansion; for
example, New York City Mayor Bill de
Blasio in 2014 implemented a universal
pre-K program.
Although researchers have found
that early childhood programs from
decades ago had sizable benefits for
students that lasted into adulthood,
evidence from more recent (and lessexpensive) programs has been mixed.
Moreover, recent studies have focused
on a modest number of programs,
often high-quality ones, in a few states.
It is unclear whether the effects of
previously studied programs generalize
to the cheaper programs more
commonly implemented.
We perform the first national
analysis of public pre-K’s effects
on standardized test scores, special
education assignment, and grade
retention, using data from thousands
of school districts throughout the
country. We estimate the impacts of
typical public school pre-K programs,
as well as how impacts vary for districts
of different types.
Our analysis reveals the following:
1) The typical public pre-K
program has no positive effects
on 4th grade outcomes. We
can rule out impacts from full
pre-K adoption as small as 2
percentiles in math and reading
test scores and 3 percentage
points in special education
assignment and grade retention.
2) However, for districts in states
with high-quality programs
(based on prior assessment by

other experts), pre-K boosts 4th
grade math test scores by 2.8
percentiles, twice the necessary
threshold to pass a benefit-cost
test in terms of predicted future
earnings of students.
3) For districts with majority
African American enrollment,
pre-K program effects are even
larger, with increases of 5.9
percentiles in math and 3.8
percentiles in reading. Among
such districts in high-quality
states, the increases are 6.6 and
7.4 percentiles, respectively.
Whereas many prior studies looking
at high-quality programs analyzed what
a pre-K program could do under the
right circumstances, we look at what
typical pre-K programs have done in
practice over the past two decades. The
typical public school pre-K program,
which may have been of relatively poor
quality, has done little for the average
student. But these programs have
substantively large benefits when they
are either higher quality or operated in
more disadvantaged school districts.
Because much of the current policy
debate is about the desirability of
large-scale expansion of pre-K, these
findings are highly policy relevant. For
large-scale expansion of pre-K to make
sense, policymakers must keep the
quality up. If funds are more limited,
pre-K should be targeted.
Analyzing Public School Pre-K across
Thousands of Districts
To evaluate pre-K programs in
public school districts, we need data on
both pre-K enrollments and academic
outcomes for many districts. We get
both from the U.S. Department of
Education. Pre-K enrollment is readily

ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS
 In states with high-quality programs, there is a significant
gain of 2.8 percentiles on math tests.
 Pre-K programs can produce significant medium-term
benefits, enough to pass a benefit-cost test, but this is more
likely with high-quality programs or disadvantaged student
populations.
publicly available for almost every
district every year. We create a scale
measure by dividing a district’s pre-K
enrollment by its grade 1 enrollment.
Since 1st grade enrollment is universal,
this approximates the fraction of
students in a district who were enrolled
in pre-K each year.
In the early 1990s, the typical (or
median) school district had no pre-K,
but the top tenth of districts had at least
one-quarter of each year’s students in
pre-K. By the 2007–2008 school year,
the typical district had about one-fifth
of its students attend pre-K, and the top
tenth of districts had nearly 90 percent
of their students attending pre-K.
Measuring academic outcomes
at the district level is harder. We
use confidential data from the
National Assessment of Educational
Progress (NAEP), also known as the
Nation’s Report Card, a nationally
representative standardized test, with
core subjects in math and reading for
4th graders. These data allow us to link
average student outcomes at the school
district level with the pre-K enrollment
of the same districts five years earlier—
when the tested 4th graders should
have been of pre-K age. Although not
every school district takes the NAEP
every time it is administered, enough
do that we have outcomes for math
and reading test scores for more than
5,000 school districts from the late
1990s through 2013. (In the full paper,

This article is based on a working paper titled
“Pre-K in the Public Schools: Evidence from within
U.S. States.” The paper is available at http://
research.upjohn.org/up_workingpapers/285/.
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we look at other available outcomes
that pre-K may influence, particularly
those that rely on socioemotional
skills: the fraction of students in
special education and the fraction who
repeated a grade.)
The Effects of Public School Pre-K
We estimate the impact of pre-K
by comparing changes in outcomes
among districts that expanded
pre-K with changes in outcomes for
districts that did not expand pre-K.
This strategy allows us to control
for permanent differences across
districts. We also statistically adjust for
changing characteristics of districts,
notably per-student spending, as well
as of students, such as sex, race and
ethnicity, participation in the federal
assisted lunch program, and whether
the student is an English-language
learner. (The full paper provides details
on methodology.)
The first bar of Figure 1 shows
the impact for a typical district of
switching from no pre-K to full pre-K

on math test score performance,
measured in percentiles. The estimate
of 0.2 means that moving from an
environment in which none of a
district’s students attend public pre-K
to one in which all the students attend
pre-K is expected to raise math test
scores by 0.2 percentiles—a tiny effect
that is statistically indistinguishable
from zero. What’s more, although
all statistical estimates come with a
margin of error, the margin on this
estimate is small enough that we
can rule out effects as slight as 1.5
percentiles. As discussed below, this
upper bound is just barely at the level
needed to balance future social benefits
(through higher future earnings of
students) with program costs; it is
also well below the benefit-cost ratio
estimated for earlier, high-quality
programs, such as Perry Preschool and
the Chicago Child Parent Center.
However, states vary considerably
in their funding and regulation
of public pre-K programs, from
per-pupil spending to necessary

Figure 1 Pre-K Boosts 4th Grade Math Test Scores More When It’s High-Quality and in Heavily
African American Districts
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NOTE: The figure shows the estimated gain in percentiles for 4th grade math test scores when a school district of the
indicated type shifts from no pre-K enrollment to full pre-K enrollment for the cohort. Pre-K enrollment is measured
five years prior to 4th grade test scores.
SOURCE: Authors’ analysis of data from the National Assessment of Educational Progress and Common Core of Data.
See the working paper for full details.
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teacher credentials to teacher pay to
curriculum. District implementation
will vary within states, but is likely
to be higher in states with stronger
requirements. Drawing from expert
opinion and findings from previous
research, we identified—prior to our
analysis—five states likely to have highquality pre-K programs: Maryland,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, North
Carolina, and Oklahoma. The second
bar in Figure 1 shows the impact of
public school pre-K for districts in
these five states. At 2.8 percentiles from
switching from no pre-K to full pre-K,
it is much larger than the impact for
the typical district across all states and
easily passes a benefit-cost test. Quality
clearly matters for effectiveness.
Additionally, among previous
studies of smaller-scale early childhood
education programs, the largest effects
have generally been found for those
that target heavily disadvantaged
students. In the last two columns, we
show pre-K impacts among districts
that are majority African American,
overall and within high-quality states.
These districts, whether they are urban
or rural, often have high poverty rates:
roughly three-quarters of students are
eligible for free or reduced-price lunch
in the typical district. Pre-K effects
in these districts are substantively
large, at 5.8 percentiles overall and 6.6
percentiles in districts in high-quality
states. Although not shown in the
figure, we also find large impacts on
reading scores of 3.8 percentiles overall
and 7.4 percentiles among districts in
high-quality states. The magnitude of
these effects is consistent with earlier
studies of smaller programs; we show
that similar effects are found for largerscale public programs.
Overall, these pre-K impacts are
consistent with a reasonable story.
Pre-K in the average district for the
typical student is of insufficiently high
quality to create large positive benefits.
However, pre-K is of sufficiently high
quality on average to create benefits for
some disadvantaged students—notably,
for students in majority-black school
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districts. Furthermore, in high-quality
states, pre-K can create benefits for
broader groups of students.
Factors to Keep in Mind When
Evaluating Pre-K Programs
Only modest impacts are
necessary for pre-K to have predicted
long-term benefits greater than
costs. The average state-funded pre-K
program costs about $5,700 per
student per year. Research shows that
a 1-percentile increase in 4th grade
test scores raises lifetime earnings by
about $4,000. If pre-K boosts average
test scores by just 1.4 percentiles,
the expected future earnings gains
are enough to pay for the cost of the
program. Detecting these small effects
requires a lot of data, as in the current
analysis.
Pre-K effects can fade in middle
grades before returning later in life.
Many studies have found effects of
pre-K immediately after the program,
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but that these effects partially fade
out during the late elementary and
middle school years. Older programs
have shown positive effects returning
in adulthood, such as greater earnings
and less contact with the criminal
justice system. These patterns may
occur if pre-K has lasting impacts on
hard-to-detect socioemotional skills,
but test scores are highly dependent
on curriculum, which converges for
students regardless of pre-K exposure.
Our analysis cannot speak to the
possibility of the average public pre-K
program having long-term effects;
therefore, our analysis is conservative.
Children not attending public
pre-K may be attending another
early childhood education program.
The well-publicized evaluation of the
Head Start Impact Study found little
net impact later in elementary school.
Subsequent research, however, found
that this was because many children
not assigned to Head Start attended
another program instead; Head Start

effects were much greater relative to
students who attended no program.
In our context, it is likely that some
children not attending public school
pre-K were attending private preschool
or a standalone Head Start center. In
our analysis, we statistically control
for the availability of Head Start and
private preschool slots geographically
close to each public school district;
these controls do not change our
findings.
This article stems from work that was
supported by the Russell Sage Foundation
(grant number 83-14-20). However, the
Russell Sage Foundation was not involved in
the study design; in the collection, analysis,
and interpretation of data; or in the writing
of the full paper or the article. These tasks are
solely attributable to the authors. We thank
the Russell Sage Foundation for its generous
support.

Timothy J. Bartik is a senior economist and Brad
Hershbein is an economist at the Upjohn Institute.

New from Upjohn Press
The Impacts of China’s Rise on the Pacific and the World
Wei-Chiao Huang and Huizhong Zhou, Editors
China’s economic growth over the past few
decades is remarkable. On its current path,
projections are for it
to surpass U.S. gross
domestic product
in the year 2028.
Paralleling this
economic growth is
China’s expanding
geopolitical reach
and influence. The
combination of
these two forces—
economic and political— makes China, by
many accounts, the most important diplomatic

challenge facing its neighbors, the United States,
and rest of the world’s nations.
But does the recent concentration of power
around Xi Jinping—which includes tighter
societal controls and adopting Xi’s distrust of
private markets—offer China a path forward
for sustained rapid growth? And will China
use its growing political influence, backed by
a modernized military, to destabilize existing
regimes?
The editors of this book have assembled a group
of China experts who weigh in on such issues.
Together, they offer an in-depth look at key

internal factors influencing China’s economy as
well as factors that will impact the U.S.-China
relationship for years to come.
Contributors include Murray Scot Tanner, Barry
Naughton, Wing Thye Woo, Mary E. Lovely
and Yang Liang, Guanzhong James Wen, and
Xiaodong Zhu.
164 pp. 2018
$40 cloth 978-0-88099-633-4
$18 paper 978-0-88099-632-7
Read the first chapter and learn how to order at
http://research.upjohn.org/up_press/248/.
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2018 DISSERTATION AWARD — NOW ACCEPTING SUBMISSIONS
The W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research invites submissions for its 24th annual prize for the best PhD dissertation
on employment-related issues. A first prize of $2,500 is being offered. Up to two honorable mention awards of $1,000 may also be
given. The Institute supports and conducts policy-relevant research on issues related to employment, unemployment, and social
insurance programs. The dissertation award furthers this mission. The dissertation may come from any academic discipline, but it
must have a substantial policy thrust. Dissertations will be evaluated by a panel of economists using the following criteria:
• Policy relevance
• Technical quality of the research
• Presentation
Any person whose dissertation has been accepted during the 24-month period from July 1, 2016, to June 30, 2018, is eligible for
the 2018 prize. The deadline for submission is July 6, 2018. Applicants must send a 10-page summary of the dissertation, CV, and
a letter of endorsement from their dissertation advisor to the following address:
Upjohn Institute Dissertation Award
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
300 South Westnedge Avenue
Kalamazoo, MI 49007-4686
or by email to: communications@upjohn.org
Applicants are advised that they will need to supply a copy of their entire dissertation if they are selected as a finalist, and they may
only apply for the award once. Additional information may be obtained by correspondence sent to the address above or by calling
269/343-5541. Information is also available at www.upjohn.org.
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